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Abstract
When payos from dierent actions are unknown, agents use their own past experience
as well as the experience of their neighbors to guide their current decision making. This
paper develops a general framework to study the relationship between the structure of
information ows and the process of social learning.
We show that in a connected society, local learning ensures that all agents obtain the
same utility, in the long run. We develop conditions under which this utility is the max-
imal attainable, i.e. optimal actions are adopted. This analysis identies a structural
property of information structures { local independence { which greatly facilitates social
learning. Our analysis also suggests that there exists a negative relationship between
the degree of social integration and the likelihood of diversity. Simulations of the model
generate spatial and temporal patterns of adoption that are consistent with empirical
work.
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1. Introduction
In a wide variety of economic environments, individual agents are obliged to choose a
course of action without being fully informed about the true payo from the dierent
options. As time goes by, they learn from their own past experience; moreover, since
experiments are often expensive and time consuming, they also try and gather informa-
tion from the experience of others, both through personal communication as well through
magazines and professional journals.
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In this paper we develop a general framework
to understand how the structure of information links in a society aects the genera-
tion of information (via the actions individuals choose) as well as its social dissemina-
tion.
We consider a society with a large number of agents, each of whom faces a similar de-
cision problem: choose an action at regular intervals without knowing the true payos
from dierent actions. The action chosen generates a random reward and also provides
information concerning the true payos. Before choosing an action, an agent uses her own
past experience as well as the experience of a subset of the society, viz. her neighbors, to
revise her beliefs about the true payos.
3
Given these beliefs, an agent chooses an optimal
action. In this setting, we study the evolution of agents' beliefs, actions and utilities. Our
interest is in the following types of questions:
 What features of an information structure facilitate/hinder the social adoption of an
optimal action?
 What type of neighborhood structures sustain diversity/conformism?
4
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Examples of such environments include consumers learning about dierent brands, farmers learning
about the productivity of a new crop and doctors learning about the ecacy of new treatments. Empirical
work has documented the importance of learning from `others' in several contexts, such as the adoption
of new crops (Ryan and Gross, 1943), the diusion of patent drugs (Coleman, 1966), the choice of new
agricultural techniques (Hagerstrand, 1969; Rogers, 1983), economic demography (Watkins, 1991) and the
purchase of consumer products (Kotler, 1986).
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This experience includes the choice of action as well as the corresponding outcome. This is a natural
formulation in the examples mentioned in footnote 1 above. We assume that agents use only the informa-
tion available from the realizations of actions taken by their neighbors, and that they do not attempt to
make any inferences from the choices of their neighbors per se. Thus, we suppose that agents are `bounded
Bayesians'. Our assumptions concerning individual decision rules are discussed in greater detail in section
2.3.
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Diversity refers to a situation in which dierent groups of agents choose dierent actions, while con-
formism describes the outcome with everyone choosing the same action.
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 What are the spatial and temporal patterns of adoption when individuals learn from
their neighbors? Are these patterns consistent with empirical observations?
Our analysis is restricted to connected societies
5
and we start by establishing an important
property of such societies: the limiting (expected) utilities of all agents are equal (Theorem
3.2). The proof of this theorem uses the following arguments. We rst establish that if
an agent i takes some action x innitely often then the limiting utility is equal to the
true payo from action x. Next, we consider two agents i and j and suppose that j is
a neighbor of i. If agent j takes some action x
0
innitely often then her limiting util-
ity is equal to the true payo from action x
0
. We then establish the following intuitive
property: if i observes j then the true payo from x must be at least as high the true
payo from x
0
. We note that this property of limiting utilities is transitive. The proof is
completed by using the denition of connectedness along with this transitivity of limiting
utilities.
Theorem 3.2 implies that, in the long run, agents cannot choose actions yielding dierent
payos. This motivates the study of two related questions: one, do agents choose the
optimal action, and two, can dierent actions with the same payo survive, in the long
run?
We rst study the complete learning question. In this analysis we focus on large soci-
eties, i.e. societies with a countably innite number of agents.
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We begin with an ex-
ample of incomplete learning. In this example, every agent has to choose between two
actions, one whose payo is known and a second action whose payo is unknown; thus
agents do not know which action is optimal. We suppose that agents are located on in-
teger points of the real line and each agent observes the agent on either side of her. In
addition, there exists a `Royal Family', i.e. a small set of agents who are observed by
everyone.
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We suppose that the action with unknown payo is the optimal action and
5
A society is said to be connected, if for very pair of agents i and j, either j is a neighbor of i or there
exist agents fi
1
;    ; i
m
g, such that i
1
is a neighbor of i, i
2
is a neighbor of i
1
and so on, until j is a neighbor
of i
m
. This is a very general class of societies. Familiar examples of connected societies are (a) agents
located on points of a d-dimensional lattice in which every agent observes her immediate 2
d
neighbors;
(b) an organization tree where each person observes their immediate superior and subordinates; (c) agents
located around a circle, observing their immediate neighbors and in addition observing a common set of
agents who are sampled by a consumer magazine; (d) a group of agents with public observability.
6
Using standard arguments it can be shown that learning is generally incomplete in nite agent societies.
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This structure corresponds to situations in which individuals have access to local as well as a common
public source of information. Thus it is quite prevalent in everyday life. For example, such a structure
arises naturally in the context of agriculture where individual farmers observe their neighboring farmers
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also that initially everyone's prior beliefs favor the adoption of this action. Thus an in-
nite number of independent trials of this action are undertaken in the society; despite
this, we show that there is a positive probability that the society will choose the sub-
optimal action eventually. This happens because, in our example, the Royal Family can
generate sucient negative information that can overwhelm any locally gathered posi-
tive information, thereby inducing all agents to switch to the action with known payos.
This means that no further information is generated and thus the society is locked into
an inferior choice. We can also show that in the absence of the Royal Family, the so-
ciety will choose the optimal action in the long run. Thus, this example illustrates an
interesting aspect of social learning: more information links can make the society worse
o .
The example with incomplete learning also helps us identify alternative sets of condi-
tions on the structure of neighborhoods, the distribution of prior beliefs and the infor-
mativeness of actions, that are sucient for complete learning (Theorems 4.1-4.2 and
Proposition 4.1). Our results on complete learning highlight the role of locally indepen-
dent agents. The general argument proceeds as follows. First, given an agent i, we can
choose a set of sample paths A
i
having positive probability with the following proper-
ties: A
i
depends only upon the realizations agent i observes, and moreover sample paths
in A
i
have a uniform upper bound on the amount of negative information concerning
optimal actions.
8
The conditions in Theorem 4.1 ensure that the prior beliefs of some
agents are suciently optimistic to overcome this negative information; thus an agent i
with `optimistic beliefs' will choose an optimal action forever on the set A
i
.
9
We say
that two agents i and i
0
are locally independent if they have non-overlapping neighbor-
hoods, i.e. they observe dierent sets of agents. For two such agents the corresponding
events A
i
and A
i
0
are independent. This implies that the probability that neither i nor
i
0
tries an optimal action forever is bounded above by the product of the probabilities
but all the farmers observe a few large farmers and research laboratories. Another setting with this struc-
ture is a consumer goods market; individual consumers discuss purchase decisions with their colleagues
and friends and all potential customers read one or two consumer magazines which report on some ex-
periments/consumer experiences. A third example pertains to research activity; individual researchers
typically keep abreast of developments in their own narrow area of specialization, and also try to keep
informed about the work of the pioneers/intellectual leaders in their subject more broadly dened.
8
This construction is possible in our model because agents do not make inferences from the choices of
their neighbors, but only from the realizations of the choices.
9
Our other complete learning results, Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, impose restrictions on the
informativeness of actions to ensure that an agent will choose only optimal actions from a nite point
onwards, with positive probability.
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that neither A
i
nor A
i
0
occur. Hence the probability bound on the event that no one
from a set of locally independent agents chooses an optimal action forever is exponen-
tially decreasing in the number of such agents and in the limit equals 0. The nal step
in the argument invokes Theorem 3.2 to show that in a connected society the probabil-
ity of a society choosing suboptimal actions in the long run is subject to the same upper
bound.
We next study the conformism vs. diversity question: can dierent groups of agents in a
connected society take dierent actions (having the same payos)? Diversity suggests that
there exist boundaries, with agents on one side of the boundary choosing one action while
agents on the other side choose a dierent action. Our analysis focuses on the sources of
information of the boundary agents. We argue, with the help of an example, that diversity
is easier to sustain when agents on each side of the boundary have more information links
with agents who choose as they do, i.e. with agents on the same side of the boundary
(Proposition 5.1). The proof of this result uses the law of iterated logarithm and is of
independent technical interest. We also show that, in the context of this example, public
observability implies conformism (Proposition 5.2). Taken together, the propositions also
make the more general point that the structure of information ow in societies have a
direct bearing on the likelihood of diversity.
We study the temporal and spatial patterns of diusion by simulating the choices of a
group of farmers trying to learn the true productivity of a new crop. We nd that the
temporal pattern (percentage of adopters vs. time) is described quite well by the logistic
function, and that the rate of adoption is positively related to the protability of the new
crop. These results are consistent with empirical ndings (Griliches, 1959; Feder, Just and
Zilberman, 1985). We also observe that for dierent model specications and parameter
values the speed of convergence is fairly rapid. Finally, with regard to the spatial patterns
we nd that initially small groups of farmers adopt the new crops and then it slowly spreads
as neighboring agents adopt it as well. Eventually these regions join up and the pace of
diusion accelerates. These ndings match the empirically observed spatial patterns (see
e.g., Hagerstrand (1969)).
Our paper is a contribution to the theory of social learning; we now discuss its relation-
ship with some recent work by Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995).
10
In Ellison and
Fudenberg's models, agents use only currently available social information such as recent
10
Some other papers in this area are An and Kiefer (1992) and Smallwood and Conlisk (1983).
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popularity weighting and disregard historical data (including their own past experience) in
making decisions. By contrast, in our model agents do use historical information; moreover,
the bounded Bayesian decision rule they employ precludes the use of popularity weighting.
Ellison and Fudenberg study the possibility of obtaining ecient outcomes and social diver-
sity under dierent levels of popularity weighting and sample sizes. While our paper also
studies eciency and conformism, we focus on the role of prior beliefs and neighborhood
structures. These dierences suggest that our paper should be viewed as complementary
to their work.
More generally, our paper should be seen as contributing to the theory of Bayesian learn-
ing. Research in this tradition has focused on cases where individual agents privately
observe a signal and also have access to some central statistic. This central statistic
varies depending on the model; in models of rational expectations learning, for instance,
market prices are the central statistic, while in the recent work on herding/information
cascades the actions of all previous agents are publicly observable.
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The work on herd-
ing/information cascades considers situations where a sequence of individuals (who make
one-shot decisions) learn from the actions of their predecessors. By contrast, in our frame-
work, agents take actions repeatedly and learn from their own past experience as well as
the experience of their neighbors. Our formulation of neighborhoods captures in a natural
form the ow of information in such settings, thereby enabling us to explore the rela-
tionship between social structure and learning. Our paper can be viewed as integrating
the two strands of literature dealing with social learning and Bayesian learning respec-
tively.
Finally, our paper can also be regarded as studying the dynamics of technology adop-
tion. Our example on incomplete learning in the presence of a Royal Family provides
new insights about how the structure of information ows can generate `lock-ins' into in-
ferior technologies.
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In this connection we would also like to mention the early work of
Allen (1982a, 1982b) which explores the role of neighborhood inuence on the invariant
distribution of a process of technology adoption. Our paper extends her work by consid-
ering social learning in an explicit model of (Bayesian) individual decision making and
learning.
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See Blume and Easley (1992) for a survey of the rational expectations learning literature; recent
papers on multi-agent models of Bayesian learning include Aghion, Paz-Espinosa and Jullien (1993), Bala
and Goyal (1994, 1995) and Bolton and Harris (1992). Banerjee (1992) and Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch (1992) are the standard references on herding/information cascades.
12
See e.g. Arthur(1989).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3-5
presents our results while section 6 discusses simulations of spatial and temporal patterns
of learning. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Preliminaries: Let  be a nite set of possible states of the world, X be a nite
set of actions and let Y be the space of outcomes. If the state of the world is  2 
and an agent chooses action x 2 X, he observes outcome y with conditional density
(y; x; ) and obtains reward r(x; y). We make the following assumptions about Y ,  and
r(x; y).
(A.1) Y is a non-empty, separable metric space. The distribution of outcomes
13
condi-
tional on x and  can be represented by the density (; x; ) with respect to a measure ,
dened on the Borel subsets of Y .
(A.2) For each x 2 X, r(x; ) is bounded and measurable in Y .
Agents do not know the true state of the world, and they enter with a prior belief in the
set D() of beliefs (probability distributions) over the state of nature :
D() = f = f()g
2
j for all  2 ; ()  0 and
X
2
() = 1g: (2:1)
Given belief  an agent's one-period expected utility u(x; ) from taking action x is :
u(x; ) =
X
2
()
Z
Y
r(x; y)(y; x; )d,(y): (2:2)
Note that u(x; ) is linear on D() for every x 2 X. We assume that individuals have
the same preferences.
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Let G : D() ! X be the one-period optimality correspon-
dence:
G() = fx 2 X j u(x; )  u(x
0
; ) for all x
0
2 Xg;  2 D(): (2:3)
Let 

be the point mass belief on the state ; then G(

) denotes the set of expost optimal
actions if the true state is  2 D(). (In the rest of the paper, we refer to expost optimal
actions as `optimal actions').
13
In what follows, we shall use the words outcomes/realizations/observations interchangeably.
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We have also explored the learning process when agents have heterogeneous utilities. Our results
on limiting utilities and learning carry over if for each group of agents of a given preference type, taken
separately, connectedness obtains.
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We now give two examples which are special cases of the above framework. The rst
example helps to clarify the basic structure, while the second example is the canoni-
cal bandit model (Berry and Fristedt, 1985) and illustrates the generality of our frame-
work.
Example 2.1: There are two actions x
o
and x
1
and two states, 
o
and 
1
. In state 
1
,
action x
1
yields Bernoulli distributed payos with parameter  2 (1=2; 1); in state 
o
pay-
os from x
1
are Bernoulli distributed with parameter 1   . Furthermore, in both states
action x
o
yields payos which are Bernoulli distributed with parameter 1=2. Hence, x
1
is
the optimal action if the true state is 
1
while x
o
is the optimal action if 
o
is the true
state. The belief of an agent is a number  2 (0; 1), which represents the probability that
the true state is 
1
.
15
In this example, the one period optimality correspondence is given
by:
G() =

x
1
if   1=2;
x
o
if   1=2.
(2:4)
Example 2.2: There is a nite set of actions X; each of the actions can be one of s  2
quality levels or types. We suppose that the s quality types are labelled fq
1
; : : : ; q
s
g. If an
action x is of quality q
m
then it generates observations with a density 
m
(y) and a reward
r(y). The expected value of an action of type q
m
is
V
m

Z
Y
r(y)
m
(y)d,(y): (2:5)
Let the quality levels be strictly ordered according to ascending expected value, i.e. V
1
<
V
2
< : : : < V
s
. This induces an ordering  among quality levels where q
j
 q
k
if and only
if V
j
< V
k
. Any two distinct actions are independent. This implies that a belief  can be
written as
 = ff(x; q)g j
X
q2fq
1
;:::;q
s
g
(x; q) = 1; (x; q)  0; 8x and qg: (2:6)
In terms of the model presented earlier, a state  2  is a specication of the quality types
of the various actions. Let  be the initial belief of an agent in the society. We assume as
before that the belief is interior, i.e. for each x and each quality type q, (x; q) > 0. Recall
15
A natural interpretation of this example is to view action x
o
as an established technology, whose payo
is known, and action x
1
as a new technology, whose payo is uncertain.
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that u(x; ) gives the expected one-period utility of choosing x when the belief is . Thus,
equation (2.2) can be rewritten as
u(x; ) =
X
q
j
2fq
1
;:::;q
s
g
(x; q
j
)V
j
: (2:7)
Finally, we also allow for an additional kind of action which is completely uninformative
i.e. provides the same expected payo in all states of nature.
16
The set of actions is thus
given by X = X
T
[ fx
u
g where X
T
is the set of actions each of which can be one of s
types and x
u
is the uninformative action.
2.2 The Social Structure: The set of agents is a non-empty set N which can be nite or
countably innite. For each i 2 N , let N(i) denote the set of neighbors of agent i. The
statement `j is in N(i)' is to be interpreted as saying that agent i has access to the entire
past history of agent j's actions and outcomes. By contrast, if j is not a neighbor of i,
then i does not observe any of j's actions or outcomes. Throughout this paper we shall
suppose i 2 N(i) for every agent i. We also assume that the set N(i) is a nite set for
all i 2 N . Let N
 1
(i) = fj 2 N j i 2 N(j)g; the set N
 1
(i) is the set of all agents who
observe agent i.
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The `Royal Family' is the set R = fj 2 N j N
 1
(j) = Ng, i.e. those
agents who are observed by everyone.
A society comprises of the set of agents and the neighborhoods of each of the agents.
We shall say that a society is connected if, for every i 2 N and every other agent
j 2 N there exists a sequence of agents fi
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
m
g (depending upon i and j) such
that i
1
2 N(i); i
2
2 N(i
1
), and so on until j 2 N(i
m
). The analysis in this paper
is restricted to connected societies; we focus on such societies because all other types
of societies can be analyzed as a collection of connected societies. In what follows, for
expositional simplicity, we shall usually omit the term `connected' while referring to soci-
eties.
2.3 The Dynamics of the Model: Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1; 2; : : :. At the
beginning of period 1, each agent i has a prior belief 
i;1
2 D(). We assume :
(A.3) For all i 2 N; 
i;1
2 Int(D()):
16
In the context of crop choice, this corresponds to a case where the farmer decides not to plant any
crop. Likewise, in situations where consumers are making brand choices this action is the `no purchase'
option.
17
If the observation relation is symmetric, this set clearly coincides with N(i). However, there are
many sources of communication (e.g. radio, television, books, journals and gossip!) which do not possess
symmetry. Our framework allows for asymmetric observational links.
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where Int(D()) denotes the interior of the belief space. It is worth noting that we do not
restrict the agents to have identical priors.
For each i 2 N , let g
i
: D() ! X be a selection from the one-period optimality corre-
spondence G of equation (2.3) above. In period 1, each agent i plays the action g
i
(
i;1
)
and observes the outcome. Agent i also observes the actions taken and outcomes obtained
by the other agents in N(i). In periods t = 2 and beyond, each agent i rst computes
her posterior belief 
i;t
based on the experiences of the agents in N(i). In this regard,
we assume that agents employ a \bounded Bayesian" learning algorithm. This algorithm
species that agents modify their prior beliefs to posterior ones, using Bayes rule in con-
junction with the information obtained from their own and their neighbors' experiences.
However, they do not attempt to extract any information from the observed choices of
their neighbors.
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After forming her posterior 
i;t
in the manner described above, agent
i then chooses the action g
i
(
i;t
) which maximizes one-period expected utility, and the
process continues in this manner. Thus, agents are being boundedly rational both in
choosing their optimal action myopically given their beliefs and also in forming posterior
beliefs.
The assumptions on individual decision making described above are not standard and
we now discuss the motivation behind them. We are interested in analyzing the process
by which individual agents make use of information gathered from their neighbors and
the implications of this local learning for aggregate social outcomes. This suggests, rst,
that individual choice should not be arbitrary and, second, that there must be a well de-
ned mechanism through which information from neighbors is incorporated in individual
decisions. Given that the information observed by agents is partial, a model with fully
rational agents would require that the learning problem of the agents be formulated as a
dynamic Bayesian game of incomplete information. In such a formulation, the inuence
of neighborhood structure would interact with the incentives for strategic experimenta-
tion in addition to inducing a complex inference problem for agents. In this paper our
concern is with the relationship between neighborhood structure and learning. To keep
the model mathematically tractable and to allow us to focus on this relationship we have
made certain simplifying assumptions on individual decision rules. Thus we assume that
agents are myopic expected utility maximizers, which eliminates incentives for strategic
18
This formulation thus rules out the use of popularity weighting and related measures in the learning
process. Note, however, that Bayesian updating provides a relatively simple way for each agent to keep
track of the information in past history. We also remark that while the bounded Bayesian learning rule
employed here may not be ecient, it is consistent in our framework.
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experimentation. Secondly, we also note that a Bayesian who knows the structure of the
model should be able to incorporate information on the popularity of dierent choices
among her neighbors in forming posterior beliefs. This possibility is precluded in our
model, thus eliminating the inference problem and simplifying the belief revision process
considerably.
We now briey sketch the construction of the probability space since the notation is re-
quired for the results. Details are provided in Appendix A. For a xed  2  we dene
a probability triple (
;F ;P

), where 
 is the space containing sequences of realizations
of actions of all agents over time, and P

is the probability measure induced over sample
paths in 
 by the state  2 .
Let  be endowed with the discrete topology, and suppose B is the Borel -eld on this
space. For rectangles of the form AH where A   and H is a measurable subset of 
,
let P
i
(AH) be given by
P
i
(AH) =
X
2A

i;1
()P

(H): (2:8)
for each agent i 2 N . Each P
i
extends uniquely to all of B  F . Since every agent's
prior belief lies in the interior of D(), the measures fP
i
g are pairwise mutually absolutely
continuous. All stochastic processes are dened on the measurable space ( 
;B  F).
A typical sample path is of the form ! = (; !
0
) where  is the state of nature and !
0
is
the innite sequence of sample outcomes denoted by:
!
0
= ((y
x
i;1
)
x2X;i2N
; (y
x
i;2
)
x2X;i2N
; : : :) (2:9)
where y
x
i;t
2 Y
x
i;t
 Y . Let C
i;t
 g
i
(
i;t
) denote the action of agent i at time t, Z
i;t
the
outcome of agent i's action at time t (i.e., the signal of her own action from the out-
come space Y ) and let (Z
j;t
)
j2N(i)
be the set of outcomes of the neighbors of i at time
t. Also let U
i;t
(!) = u(C
i;t
; 
i;t
) be the expected utility of i with respect to her own
action at time t.
19
The posterior belief of agent i in period t + 1 is computed as fol-
lows:

i;t+1
() =
Q
j2N(i)
(Z
j;t
;C
j;t
; ) 
i;t
()
P

0
2
Q
j2N(i)
(Z
j;t
;C
j;t
; 
0
) 
i;t
(
0
)
: (2:10)
19
The outcomes of actions are projections of ! onto the respective coordinates. We assume that if agent
i has chosen action x
0
for the t
th
time on !, he observes the coordinate y
x
0
i;t
(!).
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The -eld of agent i's information at the beginning of time 1 is F
i;1
 f;;  
g. For
every t  2, dene F
i;t
as the -eld generated by the past history of agent i's observa-
tions of her neighbors' actions and outcomes, i.e. the random variables (C
j;1
; Z
j;1
)
j2N(i)
;
: : : ; (C
j;t 1
; Z
j;t 1
)
j2N(i)
. Since by the rules of the process, agents only employ the in-
formation generated by their neighbors, the set classes fF
i;t
g are the relevant -elds
for our purposes. We shall denote by F
i;1
the smallest -eld containing all F
i;t
for
t  1.
3. Aggregation of Information
In this section we establish that (roughly speaking) in a connected society every agent
expects the same utility, in the long run. The rst step in the study of the long run distri-
bution of individual utilities consists of showing the convergence of a typical individual's
beliefs and utilities. The following result shows that the sequence of posterior beliefs of a
typical agent converges almost surely to a limit belief which is measurable with respect to
the (direct) limit information of the agent.
20
This result is an immediate consequence of
the Martingale Convergence Theorem.
21
Theorem 3.1 . There exists Q 2 B  F satisfying P
i
(Q) = 1 for all i 2 N and random
vectors f
i;1
g
i2N
such that
(a) For each i 2 N , 
i;1
is F
i;1
-measurable.
(b) ! 2 Q) for all i 2 N , 
i;t
(!)! 
i;1
(!).
In what follows, we restrict attention to a specic state of nature which is taken to be the
true state. We shall denote this state by 
1
. Clearly, the set
Q

1
 f! = (; !
0
) 2 Q j  = 
1
g:
has P

1
probability 1. (Strictly speaking, the domain of denition of P

1
is the measurable
subsets of 
, not of   
. However, we can regard P

1
as the conditional probabil-
ity induced by 
1
on the product space, which is the same for all agents). Without loss
of generality we assume that the strong law of large numbers holds on Q

1
. In what
follows statements of the form \with probability one" are with respect to the measure
P

1
.
20
It is worth emphasizing that Theorem 3.1 does not preclude the possibility of limit beliefs being
dierent across individual agents.
21
Proofs of results in this section are given in Appendix B.
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We next show the convergence of utilities of a typical individual in the society. For
each agent i, given ! 2 Q

1
, let X
i
(!) be the set of actions which are chosen innitely
often on the sample path. We shall refer to X
i
(!) as the set of limiting actions (of
agent i) on !. Given that every individual is a myopic optimizer, it seems natural
that the set of limiting actions should be optimal with respect to the limiting beliefs.
This is true, as part (a) of the following result shows. This result immediately implies
that each agent's one period expected payo converges as well. Recall that U
i;t
(!) 
u(C
i;t
(!); 
i;t
(!)).
Lemma 3.1 . Suppose ! 2 Q

1
.
(a) If x
0
2 X
i
(!) then x
0
2 argmax
x2X
u(x; 
i;1
(!)).
(b) There exists a real number U
i;1
(!) such that fU
i;t
(!)g ! U
i;1
(!). Furthermore,
U
i;1
(!) = u(x
0
; 
i;1
(!)) where x
0
is any member of X
i
(!).
We now examine the distribution of these limiting utilities and actions in the society. Our
analysis is summarized in the following result.
Theorem 3.2 . Suppose that the society is connected. Then U
i;1
(!) = U
j;1
(!) for all
agents i and j in N , with probability 1.
The proof of this result employs the following arguments. On a xed sample path, consider
two agents i and j and suppose i 2 N(j). We show that if x
0
is an action taken innitely
often by j then j's long run expected utility U
j;1
will be u(x
0
; 

1
). Likewise, if i chooses
x innitely often, then U
i;1
= u(x; 

1
). Furthermore, the assumption that j observes i
is shown to imply that u(x
0
; 

1
)  u(x; 

1
). Thus, U
j;1
 U
i;1
. Connectedness of the
society now yields the result.
4. Long Run Social Learning
In this section we study the optimality of long run actions.
22
Our analysis suggests that
the distribution of prior beliefs, the structure of neighborhoods and the informativeness of
22
Suppose that 
1
is the true state of the world. We shall say that long run actions of agent i are
optimal on ! if X
i
(!)  G(

1
). Likewise, beliefs of an agent i will be said to converge to the truth
along ! if 
i;1
(!) = 

1
. We shall say that complete learning (or learning with probability 1) obtains if
P

1
(\
i2N
fX
i
(!)  G(

1
)g) = 1.
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actions all play an important role in determining whether or not long run actions will be
optimal.
23
We start by noting that social learning will typically be incomplete in nite societies.
24
This motivates the study of learning in societies with innitely many agents. We begin
our analysis with two observations. The rst observation concerns the importance of the
initial distribution of priors. It is easy to see (with the help of Example 2.1) that even
in a large (innite agent) society, no learning will occur if all agents start out with prior
beliefs that lead them to choose the uninformative action. Thus for learning to occur some
restrictions on the distribution of prior beliefs are necessary. Our second observation is
that even when beliefs are favorable, the social structure of information ows may preclude
learning. The following example illustrates this point and also helps us derive sucient
conditions for complete learning subsequently.
Example 4.1: Consider the setting of Example 2.1. Suppose that the true state is 
1
and
that the society has an innite number of agents. Assume that the prior beliefs of agents
satisfy the following condition:
inf
i2N

i;1
>
1
2
; sup
i2N
<
1
1 + p
2
: (4:1)
where p = (1   )= 2 (0; 1). The above assumption implies that in period 1 all agents
will choose the optimal (and informative) action x
1
. We suppose that society N is given
by the one dimensional integer lattice. For i 2 N , the set of neighbors is assumed to be
N(i) = fi   1; i; i + 1g [ R, where R = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g constitute the Royal Family. We
23
An action x 2 X is said to be fully informative if, for all , 
0
in  such that  6= 
0
we have :
Z
Y
j(y;x; )   (y;x; 
0
)jd,(y) > 0:
Thus a completely informative action x is statistically capable of distinguishing between any two distinct
states in the long run. Let X
I
denote the set of completely informative actions. We shall say that an action
x
u
is uninformative if (;x
u
; ) is independent of . It is worth noting that if the set of uninformative
actions X
U
is non-empty, then there is no essential loss of generality in assuming that it consists of a single
element x
u
.
24
To see why this is true consider the set up of Example 2.1. Suppose that the true state is 
1
and that
the society is nite. Prior beliefs of agents are then represented by a number 
i;1
which is the probability
that true state is 
1
. Let inf
j2N

j;1
> 1=2 and focus on the agent with the highest value of 
i;1
. Standard
arguments imply that there exists a nite sequence of T realizations of 0, such that this agent would switch
to action x
o
. Now consider the set of sample paths on which all agents get realizations of 0 for the rst
T periods. The probability of this set is positive given that realizations are independent and the number
of agents nite. The argument is completed by observing that on any sample path in this set every agent
will choose the sub-optimal (and uninformative) action x
o
after time period T .
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now note the possibility of incomplete learning: there is a strictly positive probability that
every agent will choose the suboptimal action x
o
for all t  2. The proof is as follows:
Dene

Q = fZ
j;1
= 0; 8 j 2 Rg; by construction, P

1
(

Q) = (1   )
5
> 0. We show
that if ! 2

Q, then C
i;t
(!) = x
o
for all t  2, for i 2 N . Note that on ! 2

Q, an agent
i 2 N observes 5 `negative' realizations from the Royal Family, while the maximum num-
ber of `positive' realizations that can be observed locally is 3. Thus there is a minimum
amount of residual negative information. Since 
i;1
< 1=(1 + p
2
) this negative residual
information is sucient to push the posterior belief 
i;2
below 1=2, making agent i choose
the uninformative action. The argument is completed by noting that i has been chosen
arbitrarily.
25
In the example above, one reason for incomplete learning is that the prior beliefs of
agents are not very dispersed. This allows a `little' bad experience of a few people to
convince everyone to switch to the uninformative action. This aspect of the example
motivates a study of connected societies with dispersed prior beliefs. A second source
of incomplete learning is the structure of individual neighborhoods. This structure al-
lows the negative experience of a few people (the `Royal Family') to overwhelm the lo-
cally gathered positive information of everyone in the society. This insight motivates
the study of structures where the observability level is bounded. It is also worth not-
ing that the example `works' because the negative information generated by the Royal
Family exceeds any positive information that a local neighborhood can generate. This
suggests that if an agent (or a group of them) is able to generate an arbitrarily `large'
amount of positive information with non-zero probability, then complete learning may
obtain.
In the rest of this section, we develop alternative sets of restrictions on these three factors
{ the distribution of prior beliefs, the structure of neighborhoods and the informative-
ness of actions { that are sucient for complete learning (Theorems 4.1-4.2 and Propo-
sition 4.1). While our analysis generates several useful insights, we are aware that our
results do not provide a full characterization of the conditions under which social learning
occurs.
25
We briey report simulations which assess the impact of the Royal Family on the probability of
incomplete learning. The simulations have been carried out for a society with jN j = 100 for values of
jRj between 1 and 10, and where the uncertainty is described by a Bernoulli or Normal distribution. The
results indicate that the probability of incomplete learning is not insignicant and can be as high as 0:2.
The simulations also suggest that for low values of jRj, there is a roughly positive relationship between
the probability of incomplete learning and the size of the Royal Family.
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Our results exploit the notion of locally independent agents. We shall say that agents i and i
0
are locally independent if they have non-overlapping neighborhoods, i.e. N(i)\N(i
0
) = ;.
A pairwise locally independent group of agents is a subset of N such that any two agents
in the group are locally independent. We begin with Theorem 4.1, a result which focuses
on the distribution of prior beliefs. It requires the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 . Let K be a given positive integer and suppose i is an agent satisfy-
ing jN(i)j  K. There exists d 2 (0; 1) and  > 0 such that if 
i;1
(
1
)  d then
P

1
(\
t1
fC
i;t
(!) 2 G(

1
)g)  .
Proof: Let  2 D(). We start by noting that there exists a number
^
d 2 (0; 1) such that
(
1
) 
^
d) G()  G(

1
). This follows since utility is continuous with respect to beliefs
and the number of actions is nite.
Suppose next that agent i only chooses action x for t   1 periods, and observes a se-
quence fy
x
i;
g
t 1
=1
, where each y
x
i;
2 Y
x
i;t
 Y . The agent's information about state  6= 
1
based upon her observations can be summarized by the product likelihood ratio r
x;
i;t
, dened
as:
r
x;
i;t
(!) =
Q
t 1
=1
(y
x
i;
(!); x; )
Q
t 1
=1
(y
x
i;
(!); x; 
1
)
: (4:2)
(If t = 1, we follow the convention that r
x;
i;t
= 1). It follows from an application of the law
of large numbers that r
x;
i;t
! r
x;
i
where r
x;
i
<1, almost surely (see e.g., DeGroot, 1970;
p. 201-204). Since this is true for all  6= 
1
and all x 2 X, there exists  and a set A

i
of
sample paths dened as:
A

i
=
Y
x2X
n
max
2n
1
sup
t1
r
x;
i;t
 
o

1
Y
t=1
Y
j
0
2Nni
Y
x2X
Y
x
j
0
;t
: (4:3)
such that P

1
(A

i
)  , for some number  > 0. It follows from our convention that
  1. Intuitively, on a sample path ! 2 A

i
, the maximum amount of \negative in-
formation" about state 
1
vis-a-vis state  that i can obtain from her own actions is
bounded above by 
jXj
. We now consider each agent j 2 N(i) other than i. Since
observations of individual agents are identically distributed (conditional on 
1
), it fol-
lows that for each neighbor j 2 N(i)ni, there exists a similarly dened set A

j
with
P

1
(A

j
) = P

1
(A

i
) =  > 0. (This is done by just replacing i by j everywhere in
16
equation (4.3)). Dene the set A
i
= \
j2N(i)
A

j
. Using the independence of individual
observations, it follows that:
P

1
(A
i
) = 
jN(i)j
 
K
> 0: (4:4)
The weak inequality holds since, by assumption, jN(i)j  K. Dene  = 
K
> 0. Note
that individual i's posterior belief about state 
1
at time t can be written as:

i;t
(
1
)(!) =

i;1
(
1
)(!)

i;1
(
1
)(!) +
P
 6=
1
Q
j2N(i)
Q
x2X
r
x;
j;t
(!)
i;1
()(!)
: (4:5)
where r
x;
j;t
(!) now refers to the product likelihood ratio along the sample path when the
actions fC
j;
g are chosen. We have :

i;t
(
1
)(!) 

i;1
(
1
)(!)

i;1
(
1
)(!) +
P
 6=
1

KjXj

i;1
()(!)
(4:6)
by construction of the set A
i
.
26
Since the expression on the right side of (4.6) is in-
dependent of t, it is evident that there will exist a value of d 2 (0; 1) such that if

i;1
(
1
)  d and ! 2 A
i
, then 
i;t
(!)(
1
) 
^
d for all t  1. The lemma follows.
2
In the context of Example 2.1 it follows from the theory of random walks that  can
be chosen to be 1. Since
^
d can be any number greater than the cuto  = 1=2, equa-
tion (4.6) implies that d can be chosen to equal
^
d. More generally, d like its counterpart
 will depend upon K. In the rest of this section, we shall suppose K is a xed num-
ber.
Now consider the collection of agents i 2 N who have at most K neighbors each and
such that 
i;1
(
1
)  d, where d is as given by Lemma 4.1. Let N
K;d
be a maximal
group of pairwise locally independent agents chosen from this collection, i.e., a subset
of the above collection which has the highest cardinality.
27
We can show the following
result:
26
On this set of sample paths, irrespective of the choice of actions by j 2 N(i) upto time t   1 the
corresponding r
x;
j;t
will be bounded above by . See the discussion following equation (2.9) in Section 2.
27
It is worth noting that there may be many such maximal groups of agents. For instance let N be
the set of integers, with N(i) = fi   1; i; i + 1g for all i 2 N . Fix K = 3 and suppose all agents i 2 N
satisfy 
i;1
(
1
)  d. Then the sets of agents f0; 3; 6; 9; 12; : : :g, and f: : : ; 6; 2; 2; 6; 10; : : :g are just two
of innitely many possible candidates for N
K;d
. Note that for an innite society with a Royal Family the
maximal group is at most a singleton.
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Theorem 4.1 . Consider an innite agent society which is connected and let d 2 (0; 1)
and  > 0 be as dened above. Then
P

1
([
i2N
fX
i
(w) 6 G(

1
)g)  (1  )
jN
K;d
j
: (4:7)
In particular, if jN
K;d
j =1 then complete learning obtains.
We note the following observations concerning the above result before providing its proof.
Firstly, if jN
K;d
j = 1 and G(

1
)  X
I
, where X
I
is the set of fully informative ac-
tions, then for all i 2 N , 
i;1
(!) = 

1
, with probability 1: in other words, agents'
beliefs converge almost surely to the truth. We also remark that in Example 4.1, if the
Royal Family is removed, so that only the local neighborhoods remain, i.e., for all i 2 N ,
N(i) = fi   1; i; i + 1g, then complete learning obtains. This follows directly from the
proof of Theorem 4.1 and shows that in some situations additional information links can
actually lead to a lowering of long run social welfare! Finally, we note that the uni-
form upper bound on the number of neighbors of the locally independent agents can be
relaxed to allow for the number of neighbors to increase at a suciently \slow" rate.
Lemma 4.1 is the rst step in the proof of Theorem 4.1. The remaining steps are now
given:
Step 2: Since agents in the set N
K;d
are pairwise locally independent, the probability of
every agent i 2 N
K;d
trying a sub-optimal action is given by
P

1
(\
i2N
K;d
A
c
i
)  (1  )
jN
K;d
j
: (4:8)
Step 3: We use connectedness of the society and the following general argument to show
that the probability of incomplete social learning is bounded above by the same expres-
sion. Consider some ! 2 Q

1
. Suppose there is i(!) 2 N such that C
i(!);t
2 G(

1
)
all but nitely often. Since the set of actions X is nite, this implies the existence of
x
0
2 G(

1
) such that on ! we have x
0
2 X
i(!)
(!). Remark B.1 (in the appendix) implies
U
i(!);1
(!) = u(x
0
; 

1
). This remark further implies that if x 6= x
0
also lies in X
i(!)
(!),
then u(x; 

1
) = u(x
0
; 

1
). Hence x 2 G(

1
) as well, so that X
i(!)
(!)  G(

1
). Connect-
edness (and hence Theorem 3.2) implies that U
j;1
(!) = U
i(!);1
(!) for all j 2 N . Hence
U
j;1
(!) = u(x
0
; 

1
). Furthermore, using the same remark again, U
j;1
(!) = u(x; 

1
)
for all x 2 X
j
(!). Hence X
j
(!)  G(

1
) as well. Thus [
i2N
K;d
A
i
 \
j2N
fX
j
(!) 
G(

1
)g and (4.8) above implies P

1
([
i2N
fX
i
(!) 6 G(

1
)g)  (1   )
jN
K;d
j
as required.
2
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We briey discuss some simulations of Example 2.1. We suppose the agents in N are
arranged in a circle with N(i) = fi  1; i; i + 1g (no Royal Family). Figure 1 displays the
probability of incomplete learning as a function of societal size jN j assuming the payos
in Example 2.1 are Bernoulli distributed, while Figure 2 concerns the Normal case. We
note that the probability decays quite rapidly with the size of the society; furthermore,
a regression of the log incomplete learning probability on jN j yields a very good t (the
R
2
values are all above 0.99 and between 0.94 and 0.98 in the Bernoulli and Normal cases
respectively), and suggests that the bound in (4.7) is tight.
Theorem 4.1 allows for fairly general neighborhood structures
28
and imposes no restrictions
on the informativeness of actions. The presence of a Royal Family, however, means that
jN
K;d
j  1 so that the result no longer ensures complete learning. We now propose some
conditions that are sucient for learning in societies with a Royal Family. We start by
noting that when the society contains a Royal Family, incomplete learning can arise even
if beliefs of agents are `highly optimistic', so long as they are bounded away from point
mass on the truth.
29
This motivates a stronger restriction on beliefs, which we refer to as
the heterogenous priors assumption.
(H) The distribution of prior beliefs is heterogeneous if for every  2 , and for any
open neighborhood around 

, there exists an agent whose prior belief lies in that
neighborhood.
30
We now show that in any innite connected society with sup
i2N
jN(i)j  K <1 and which
satises (H), the probability of incomplete learning is less than 1  for every  2 (0; 1). In
particular, this is also true in the presence of a Royal Family R where jRj  K. The intu-
ition behind this claim is as follows: from arguments slightly extending those in Lemma 4.1,
28
In particular, agents outside N
K;d
can have any (nite) number of neighbors. Theorem 4.1 also allows
for complete learning in some societies having agents observed by innitely many other agents. For instance
in Example 4.1, if N(i) = fi   1; i; i + 1g [ R for all i  0 and N(i) = fi   1; i; i + 1g for all i < 0,
complete learning occurs.
29
To see why this is true, consider Example 4.1 again but suppose that when x
1
is chosen, the outcome
is distributed according to the negative exponential distribution (y;x; 
k
) = 1
fy<0g

 1
k
exp(y=
k
) for
k = 0,1. Assume 
o
> 
1
> 0. Choose u(x
o
) to lie between u(x
1
; 

o
) =   
o
and u(x
1
; 

1
) =   
1
.
Suppose 
1
is the true state and that all agents i have beliefs of at most ^ < 1. It is not dicult to see
that no matter how close ^ is to 1, there is a strictly positive probability of a large negative shock from
the Royal Family which is enough to push all agents' beliefs to a level where they will only choose the
suboptimal action x
o
. Note that this can happen even if jRj = 1.
30
Heterogeneity of beliefs may be interpreted as saying that the truth must lie in the support of the
distribution of prior beliefs across agents. Since the true state is unknown, this requirement leads naturally
to the formulation above, where for any , 

lies in the support of the distribution of prior beliefs.
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for every  2 (0; 1) there is a corresponding  and a set A
i
with P

1
(A
i
)   such that
the amount of negative information that agent i can get about state 
1
from her own as
well as her neighbor's actions is bounded above by 
jXjjKj
. Using equation (4.6) we can
now establish the existence of a d 2 (0; 1) such that if 
i;1
(
1
)  d and ! 2 A
i
, then the
posterior 
i;t
(
1
) 
^
d for all time periods. It follows from (H) that there exists some indi-
vidual i whose priors satisfy 
i;1
(
1
)  d. Thus agent i will try an optimal action forever
with probability at least . The argument now follows along the lines of Steps 2 and 3 of
Theorem 4.1.
Condition (H) imposes strong restrictions on the distribution of prior beliefs
31
and it is
therefore useful to consider alternative conditions under which complete learning may ob-
tain. In our discussion following Example 4.1, we noted that if an agent is able to generate
arbitrarily large amounts of positive information with positive probability, then locally
independent groups of agents may be able to overcome negative information from the
Royal Family, ensuring complete learning. This suggests the following condition on the
informativeness of actions.
(UPI) An action x 2 X generates unbounded positive information concerning the
true state 
1
, if for every  2 (0; 1), there is a set B
x;
 Y with
R
B
x;
(y; x; 
1
)d, > 0
such that
y 2 B
x;
) max
2n
1
(y; x; )
(y; x; 
1
)
 : (4:9)
In the presence of a Royal Family two agents cannot be locally independent. We thus con-
sider the following generalization of local independence: two individuals i 62 R and i
0
62 R
are called quasi-locally independent if N(i) \ N(i
0
) = R. For more than two agents the
corresponding condition is that of pairwise quasi-local independence. Recall that
^
d 2 (0; 1)
is such that if (
1
) 
^
d then G()  G(

1
). Let
^
N
K;
^
d
be a maximal group of pairwise
quasi-locally independent agents with at most K neighbors each and having prior beliefs
which satisfy 
i;1
(
1
) 
^
d. We now have:
Proposition 4.1 . Consider a connected society with j
^
N
K;
^
d
j = 1. Suppose each x 2
G(

1
) satises condition (UPI). Then complete learning obtains.
31
In particular, a single agent with a very positive prior on the truth is responsible for virtually all of
the learning carried out by the society.
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We note that since R  N(i) for i 2
^
N
K;
^
d
, the fact that jRj  K is implicit in Proposi-
tion 4.1. The proof follows along the lines of Theorem 4.1 and may be found in Appendix C.
The main dierence arises in the case where jRj > 0. The argument for this case proceeds
by contradiction. If learning is incomplete then there must exist a set which has positive
probability, on which the negative information generated by the Royal Family is bounded
above by some number and yet learning is incomplete. We use a construction similar to
step 2 in Theorem 4.1 to establish that if there are an innite number of quasi-locally
independent agents then at least one of them will get suciently positive information in
their rst trial with an optimal action to oset this negative information. Thus at least one
agent will try an optimal action forever on any sample path of this set. This observation
taken along with the connectedness of society yields a contradiction and completes the
proof.
32
In the results described so far, social learning relies on the set of locally independent agents
who each try optimal actions with positive probability from the rst period onwards. We
now examine the possibilities of complete learning when agents do not necessarily start with
prior beliefs that favor optimal actions. In this setting, the likelihood of social learning
is sensitive to the nature of information generated by non-optimal actions across agents,
both regarding the payos of these actions themselves as well as the payos of optimal
actions.
33
We provide two alternative sets of sucient conditions on the informativeness of actions.
One set of conditions applies when realizations from an action convey no payo relevant
information concerning any other action. The second set of conditions deal with the com-
plementary situation when realizations on an action can reveal information about other
actions. The conditions are used in Theorem 4.2.
To state the result we need to introduce additional concepts. First note that x 2 X in-
duces an ordered partition of the states denoted by 
1
(x) 
x

2
(x) 
x
: : : 
x

s(x)
(x)
such that
32
To continue Example 4.1 further, suppose that when x
1
is chosen the outcome is distributed according
to the normal, exponential, Poisson or geometric (but not, of course, the negative exponential!) distribu-
tions. Then the above result applies. It also holds more generally: for example if the density functions
take one of the above forms and x 2 G(

1
) ) u(x; 

1
) > u(x; 

) for all  6= 
1
then complete learning
obtains.
33
In this context it is also worth noting that Proposition 4.1 also holds if an innite number of quasi-
locally independent agents have priors that lead them to try sub-optimal actions provided that these
actions satisfy the condition (UPI).
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(a) for each k = 1; : : : ; s(x), the expected payo u(x; 

k
) is constant for all 
k
2 
k
(x).
(b) if 
m
(x) 
x

k
(x) then u(x; 

m
) < u(x; 

k
) for 
m
2 
m
(x) and 
k
2 
k
(x).
For x 2 X, let k(x) denote the payo equivalence set of states of nature which contains

1
, i.e. 
1
2 
k(x)
(x). Also let (x)
++
 [
m>k(x)

m
(x), (x)
+
 [
mk(x)

m
(x) and
(x)
 
 [
m<k(x)

m
(x). The rst set of assumptions on informativeness of actions are
given by condition (I) stated below:
(Ia) For x; x
0
2 X, where x
0
6= x, if action x
0
is chosen and y 2 Y is observed, then for
any  2 D() the posterior belief (
m
(x))
0
= (
m
(x)) for each m = 1; : : : ; s(x).
(Ib) There exists x
1
2 G(

1
) such that if x
1
is chosen and y 2 Y is observed, then
(y; x
1
; )=(y; x
1
; 
1
) = 1 for all  2 
k(x
1
)
(x
1
).
(Ic) For x
1
as above, there exists a set B
x
1
 Y satisfying
R
B
x
1
(y; x
1
; 
1
)d,(y) > 0
and  2 (0; 1) such that
y 2 B
x
1
)
(y; x; )
(y; x; 
1
)
  < 1: (4:10)
for all  2 (x
1
)
 
.
Condition (I) can be best understood in terms of the canonical bandit model of Exam-
ple 2.2. Condition (Ia) requires that there be no essential information ows across actions,
i.e. actions are independent of each other. Condition (Ib) says that the action x
1
is in-
capable of distinguishing between states which are payo equivalent for it: in the bandit
model, payo equivalent states for x
1
correspond to states where the quality types of ac-
tions other than x
1
vary. As actions are independent, x
1
will not be able to distinguish
between these states. Condition (Ic) requires that x
1
should be capable of generating a
minimum amount of negative information concerning payo inferior states. In the bandit
model if the conditional density functions f()g have the standard monotone likelihood
ratio property (MLRP), then (Ic) holds.
We now impose some restrictions on beliefs. Let x
1
2 G(

1
) be as above. By denition,
it must be the case that u(x
1
; 

1
) > max
x2XnG(

1
)
u(x; 

1
). Hence we can nd  2 (0; 1)
and  > 0 such that
u(x
1
; 

1
) + (1  )u(x
1
; 

L
)  max
x2XnG(

1
)
u(x; 

1
) +   u
min
: (4:11)
22
where 
L
2 
1
(x
1
). Recall that 
k(x
1
)
(x
1
) is the set of states payo equivalent to state 
1
for action x
1
. Consider the collection of agents i 2 N , who have at most K neighbors each
and such that 
i;1
(
k(x
1
)
(x
1
))   for each i. Let N
K;
be a maximal group of pairwise
locally independent agents chosen from this collection. The restriction on the belief of an
agent i 2 N
K;
ensures that i will choose x
1
at least once; however, it does not preclude
suboptimal actions from being chosen at the outset.
We next consider the class of situations where actions potentially provide information
on states which are payo relevant for other actions. Recall that X
I
is the set of fully
informative actions. Assume that X = X
I
[ fx
u
g and let x
1
2 G(

1
) be given. The
case where x
u
2 G(

1
) is trivial and thus there is no loss of generality in assuming
that x
1
2 X
I
. We now state the alternative conditions on the informativeness of ac-
tions.
(Ia

) For each x 2 Xnx
u
, there exists a set B
x
 Y satisfying
R
B
x
(y; x; 
1
)d,(y) > 0
such that if action x is chosen and y 2 B
x
is observed, then for any  2 D() the
posterior belief ((x
1
)
+
)
0
 ((x
1
)
+
).
(Ib

) For each x 2 Xnx
u
and for B
x
as in (Ia

) above there exists (x) 2 (0; 1) such
that y 2 B
x
implies max
2n
1
(y; x; )=(y; x; 
1
)  (x).
Condition (Ia

) requires that for each informative action x, if y 2 B
x
is observed then this
does not yield negative information concerning payos of the optimal action x
1
. Condi-
tion (Ib

) requires that all informative actions should be capable of generating a certain
minimum amount of positive information concerning the true state. We note that condi-
tion (I

) is always satised when jj = 2.
As before, x  > 0 and 

2 (0; 1) such that 

u(x
1
; 

1
) + (1  

)u(x
1
; 

L
)  u(x
u
) + 
where 
L
2 
1
(x
1
). Let N
K;

be a maximal collection of locally independent agents having
at most K neighbors each and whose beliefs satisfy 
i;1
(
1
)  

. We can now state the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 . Consider an innite agent society which is connected. (a) Suppose that
actions satisfy condition (I). Then there exists  2 (0; 1] such that
P

1
(
[
i2N
fX
i
(!) 6 G(

1
)g)  (1  )
jN
K;
j
: (4:12)
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In particular if jN
K;
j = 1 then complete learning obtains. (b) The above conclusions
continue to hold if condition (I) is replaced by condition (I

) and N
K;
by N
K;

every-
where.
We briey intuition behind Theorem 4.2.
34
The basic dierence from the earlier results
lies in the construction of the set A
i
. In part (a) we show that for a sample path in A
i
,
agent i will observe a critical number of trials T with the optimal action x
1
. By virtue
of (Ic) this is sucient to ensure that the agent will choose only the optimal action from
some nite time onwards.
We briey discuss how condition (I

) is used in part (b). As in Lemma 4.1, we can iso-
late a set of sample paths A
i
, on which the amount of negative information obtained
by agent j 2 N(i) concerning 
1
is uniformly bounded above by . Recall that
^
d is a
number such that (
1
) 
^
d implies G()  G(

1
). Let  = max
x2Xnx
u
(x); since
 < 1, we can choose T to satisfy 

=(

+ 
T

KjXj
(1   

)) 
^
d. Dene A

j
as fol-
lows:
A

j
=
Y
x2Xnx
u
f
T
Y
t=1
B
x
j;t
 f max
2n
1
sup
tT+1
r
x;
i
(T + 1; t)  gg 
1
Y
t=1
Y
j2N(i)
Y
x2X
Y
x
j;t
(4:13)
where B
x
j;t
= B
x
for j 2 N(i) and all t  1. Let A
i
= \
j2N(i)
A

j
; familiar arguments can
be used to establish that P

1
(A
i
) =  > 0. Using condition (Ia

) we next show that along
sample paths in A
i
, the choices C
i;t
6= x
u
, for all t  T . This guarantees that agent i tries
an informative action long enough and generates positive information that is sucient to
oset any subsequent negative information concerning state 
1
. The rest of the proof is
standard.
The discussion so far has focused on the optimality of long run actions: we now summa-
rize our ndings on the distribution of limit beliefs. Recall that the beliefs of every agent
converge almost surely (Theorem 3.1). An issue of importance is whether agents learn the
truth, i.e., if limit beliefs place point mass on the true state. In general, even in cases
where long run actions are optimal, there is no guarantee that beliefs will converge to the
truth. This is because the support of the limiting beliefs distribution depends crucially on
the informativeness of the optimal actions.
35
However, as we remarked after Theorem 4.1,
if an agent chooses optimal actions in the long run and these actions are fully informative
34
The proof of part (a) is given in Appendix C. The proof of part (b) is similar, and is omitted.
35
It is not dicult to construct instances of Example 2.2 (the canonical bandit model) where beliefs fail
almost surely to place point mass on the truth despite long run actions being optimal.
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about the true state then the agent will learn the truth. Lastly, we note that in Propo-
sition 5.1 below, with positive probability some agents in a society learn the truth state
while simultaneouly other agents do not.
5. Conformism vs. Diversity
This section studies the relationship between the social structure of information ow and
the likelihood of diversity in a connected society.
36
We begin by noting an implication
of Theorem 3.2: in a connected society, two actions with dierent expected payos (con-
ditional on the true state of the world) will be chosen in the long run, with probability
zero. This observation leads us to examine the possibility of two equally attractive actions
surviving in the long run.
To analyze issues of conformity/diversity in general is quite a dicult problem. We there-
fore study these phenomena in the context of an example. Our analysis takes as xed
an individual decision problem and a certain distribution of priors. We then vary the
structure of neighborhoods and look at how the probability of diversity varies. We use
a combination of analytical and simulation methods. Our ndings suggest that prob-
ability of diversity is inversely related to the degree of social integration, as elaborated
below.
Example 5.1: We consider the following special case of Example 2.2. There are two
actions x
1
and x
2
each of two possible types, High (H) and Low (L). An action of High
type yields outcomes (and rewards) y = 1 and 0 with probabilities  and 1    respec-
tively, where  2 (1=2; 1) is a parameter. An action of the Low type also yields outcomes
of 1 and 0 but with probabilities 1    and . Thus there are four states of nature, la-
belled as (H,H), (H,L), (L,H) and (L,L). The types of actions are independent of each
other and the beliefs of an agent are given by a pair (; ) 2 [0; 1]
2
where  is the prob-
ability that x
1
is a High type and  the probability that x
2
is a High type. Since agents
are assumed to choose actions to maximize single-period expected utility, it is clear by
symmetry that an agent will choose x
1
if  > , x
2
if  <  and arbitrarily if  = .
Furthermore, denoting the outcome (1 or 0) from choosing x
1
by Z, the posterior belief is
36
We shall say that a society exhibits conformism if all agents choose the same action in the long run,
with probability 1. Correspondingly, a society exhibits diversity if dierent agents choose dierent actions
in the long run, with positive probability.
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(
0
; ) where

0
=

Z
(1  )
1 Z

Z
(1  )
1 Z
+ (1  )(1  )
Z

1 Z


+ (1  )p
2Z 1
: (5:1)
where p  (1   )= 2 (0; 1). A similar expression may be derived for  if x
2
is cho-
sen instead of x
1
. Equation (5.1) implies that if an agent observes n  0 independent
trials with x
1
, and m  0 trials with x
2
, then x
1
will be chosen in the current period
if

+ (1  )p
2S
n
 n
>

 + (1  )p
2R
m
 m
) p
2(S
n
 R
m
)+m n
<
(1  )
(1  )
: (5:2)
where S
n
denotes the number of successes in n trials with x
1
and R
m
the number of suc-
cesses in m trials with x
2
. (We adopt the convention that S
n
= 0 if n = 0 and R
m
= 0 if
m = 0).
We next specify the distribution of priors. We shall suppose there are 2k + 2 agents la-
belled as 1; : : : ; k, ,  and k+1; : : : ; 2k. We shall refer to agents 1 to k and  collectively
as the group N
1
, and the rest of the agents as group N
2
. Agents in N
1
have the same
prior belief (
1
; 
1
) with 
1
> 
1
; thus they choose x
1
in the rst period. Agents in the
N
2
all have the common belief given by (
2
; 
2
) with 
2
> 
2
; thus they choose x
2
in
the rst period. Finally, we shall suppose that the (unknown) true state of nature is

1
= (H;H).
We consider the following general information structure. All observation relations are as-
sumed to be symmetric. There is public observability within Group N
1
(i.e. all agents
in the group observe each other) and likewise within Group N
2
. The observation links
across the two groups is specied by a degree of integration parameter  2 f1; : : : ; k + 1g.
If the degree of integration is  this means that agents f1; : : : ;    1; g observe (and are
observed by) agents f; k + 1; : : : ; k +    1g.
37
Note that for any k, the case  = k + 1
corresponds to full public observability while  = 1 is the minimum required for a society
to be connected. Figure 3 shows a society with k = 3 (i.e. 8 agents) when  = 1, 2 and
k+1. The rst result derives conditions on the degree of integration that are sucient for
diversity to obtain.
37
This structure is motivated by examples of societies with well dened sub-groups { based on ethnic,
linguistic, spatial or professional considerations { where interaction within a sub-group is very regular and
at a high level but only a few members of a sub-group interact with members from another sub-group.
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Proposition 5.1 . Suppose the society is as described above. If k    + 1 > =(2   1)
then there is a strictly positive probability that all agents in group N
1
will choose x
1
forever
and all agents in group N
2
will choose x
2
forever.
The idea underlying the proof
38
can be explained by considering the case of  = 1: First,
applying standard arguments we identify a set of sample paths, which has positive prob-
ability, and on which each agent, acting in isolation, will choose his initial action forever.
We then consider agent 's behavior when the society is linked in the manner described
above. In each period, agent  observes the other members of N
1
choosing x
1
and also
sees , who is choosing x
2
. If k > 1=(2   1) then, with the help of the Law of the
Iterated Logarithm, we can show that agent  will receive positive information about
x
1
at a \faster" rate than positive information about x
2
and so will choose x
1
forever.
Furthermore, all i 2 N
1
n will choose x
1
forever since they only observe positive infor-
mation on x
1
and no information on x
2
. By symmetry, agent  will choose x
2
forever
as will all members of N
2
. Thus diversity occurs for the following reason: the agents at
the \boundary" maintain their original choices because they are more highly connected to
agents who choose as they do as compared to those who choose dierently. If the infor-
mation forthcoming from their own experience and experience of like-minded neighbors'
actions is suciently positive it `overcomes' the positive information concerning the other
action coming from across the boundary, and the agents maintain their original deci-
sion.
It is worth noting some additional features of this result. As the agents  and  observe
actions x
1
and x
2
innitely often, they will learn the true state in the long run. However,
the remaining agents observe only either x
1
or x
2
and therefore do not learn the true state.
Thus it is possible for some agents in a connected society to learn the truth while others
simultaneously do not. Secondly, the example described above exhibits \path-dependency"
since there exists another set of sample paths having positive probability such that one
action will become extinct in nite time. The proof of this statement is not dicult and
is omitted.
By way of contrast, we now consider the case of a fully integrated society, i.e. with
 = k+1, for which the above proposition does not apply. Our analysis is summarized by
the following result.
38
A proof of Proposition 5.1 is presented in Appendix D.
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Proposition 5.2 . Let the society be as described above and suppose that  = k + 1, so
that there is full public observability. Then conformity occurs, i.e. with probability 1, all
agents choose the same action forever after a nite time.
The intuition
39
for this result is as follows: Expressions (5.1)-(5.2) describe the relationship
between information generated by trials, summarized by L  2(S
n
  R
m
)   n + m, and
the priors of agents. In particular, they imply that for `high' values of L, both groups of
agents will choose action x
1
, for `low' values of L both groups of agents will choose action
x
2
, while for intermediate values of L, group 1 will choose action x
1
while group 2 chooses
action x
2
. The process L can be represented as a stationary Markov Process; the proof
then follows from the observation that for high (low) values of L, the process is a random
walk with a positive drift (negative drift), while for intermediate values it is a symmetric
random walk.
We have so far derived sucient conditions on the degree of integration for diversity to
obtain and also shown that when a society is fully integrated then conformity obtains.
We now examine how the probability of diversity varies in relation to the parameter of
integration, with the help of simulations. As a check on the robustness of our analysis, we
also consider the case of actions with normally distributed outcomes. These simulations
are summarized in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Our simulations were carried out for a
society with k = 9 (total number of agents is 20). The gures suggest that there exists an
inverse relationship between the degree of integration and the likelihood of diversity. The
intuition for this is that as  increases, the information set of agents on the `boundary'
becomes more alike, making dierent optimal choices by them less likely. Thus the agents
who make the `across-group' observations (such as  and ) choose the same actions. This
allows information about both actions to ow into a sub-group thereby precipitating a
breakdown in the `information barrier' separating N
1
and N
2
and eventually leading to
social conformism.The simulations also suggest that for xed , the likelihood of diversity
increases as  and the value of the mean (in the normal distribution case, keeping stan-
dard deviation constant) decreases. Lowering  or the value of the mean in the normal
case both have the eect of decreasing the informativeness of action x
1
, which allows the
inuence of the initial dierences in priors of the two groups N
1
and N
2
to survive more
easily.
39
A proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
28
6. Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Learning
While the results of Sections 3-5 characterize the long run outcomes in our framework,
they do not tell us much about the temporal and spatial evolution of social learning. In
this section we discuss simulations of our framework to get some idea about these is-
sues. In particular, we wish to compare the results of our simulations with the ndings
of the extensive empirical literature on diusion as a means of validating our theoretical
paradigm.
We assume the following social structure: The set of farmers N is arranged in a k  k
grid, with each farmer owning a single plot of land. In our simulations we take k = 20,
so that we have a total of 400 agents. Each farmer i observes the actions and pay-
os (observations) of her surrounding 8 neighbors. We perform simulations under dif-
ferent specications, which are special cases of Example 2.2. We now summarize our
ndings.
40
Temporal Patterns: In the rst simulation, we assume that there are two crops, one of
which (Crop 0) has a known payo of 1=2, while the other (Crop 1) represents a new,
unknown technology. Crop 1 can be of quality level q
1
= 0:45 or q
2
= 0:55; if the crop
is of quality q
k
for k = 1; 2 then its payo is Bernoulli-distributed with parameter q
k
.
We suppose that the true quality of Crop 1 is q
2
, and so it is better than Crop 0. We
also assume that the farmers' beliefs at the beginning of period 1 are heterogeneous, with
about 1% of the farmers having a prior above 1=2 and therefore experimenting with the
new crop.
The diusion curve of a typical simulation is given in Figure 6a. As can be seen, the logistic
curve tted from the data matches the adoption curve quite well. The R
2
is 0.987, which
is in the same range as obtained by Griliches (1957) in his study of the diusion of hybrid
corn. We also report a simulation where the new technology is more protable than in the
earlier case (we chose q
1
= 0:43 and q
2
= 0:57 as the quality levels). The adoption curve for
this simulation is given in the Figure 6b. As can be seen, the logistic still provides a good
t (R
2
= 0:99); however, the adoption rate is far higher, as it takes approximately half
the time for the population to adopt compared to the earlier case. This is consistent with
the result of Griliches, who found that the adoption rate was strongly positively linked
to protability. Finally, we also note that both adoption curves exhibit small downward
40
In our simulations, the opposite edges of the rectangular grid are identied with each other to ensure
that all farmers have 8 neighbors, including those living along an edge.
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uctuations, an empirical phenomenon which has been discussed by Rogers (1983). As a
check on the robustness of these patterns, we also ran simulations of a two crop model
in which the returns of the new crop were normally distributed, with unknown means.
Two typical simulations are plotted in Figures 7a and 7b. The R
2
values are 0:988 and
0:982 respectively. These gures corroborate the ndings that emerged from the Bernoulli
case.
41
Spatial Patterns: We begin with a simulation of the two crop model discussed above
when q
1
= 0:45 and q
2
= 0:55. Figure 8 shows the spatial evolution of such a simula-
tion. Initially, there are only 3 farmers who experiment with the new crop. By t = 25,
one farmer has dropped out due to bad experiences with the new crop. However, a
group of agents around the other two farmers have chosen the new crop as well. By
t = 50 the two clusters are almost in contact with each other, after which the adop-
tion rate increases rapidly. (At t = 50, the proportion of adopters is about 0:15, while
at t = 100 it has almost tripled to 0:41). By t = 200 adoption is nearly complete.
This pattern of spatial diusion is consistent with empirical evidence (Hagerstrand, 1969;
Rogers 1983).
We next consider a model which allows for the possibility that some of the actions may be
payo equivalent. This setting is interesting as it allows us to examine whether learning
from neighbors can generate diversity in social structures other than the class explored in
Section 5. In our example, there are a total of 4 crops. There are 3 quality types, with
q
1
= 0:45, q
2
= 0:55 and q
3
= 0:60. As before, Crop 0 has a known payo of 1=2. In our
simulations, we suppose that crops 1 and crop 3 are the most protable, having quality
type q
3
, while crop 2 is of type q
2
. The ex-post ranking of crops in increasing order of
protability is therefore f0; 2; (1; 3)g. Finally, farmers have heterogeneous prior beliefs,
which makes the initial choice of crops random.
The results of a typical simulation are presented in Figure 9. This simulation can be sum-
marized as follows : (a) the pattern of crop choice begins to display features of clustering
very quickly. (b) Over time, less protable crops get replaced by more protable ones.
(c) In the long run, only the most protable ones survive, with agents growing the same
crop being linked together reecting local conformism.
41
All four gures also reveal high positive serial correlation of the residuals from the logistic t. Given the
local learning structure of our model, this is intuitive, and suggests a (reduced-form) test of the hypothesis
of neighborhood learning.
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7. Concluding Remarks
When payos from dierent actions are unknown, agents use their own past experience as
well as the experience of their colleagues, friends and acquaintances as a guide for current
decisions. We model these information ows across agents in terms of neighborhoods of
individual observation. Our analysis suggests that the structure of these neighborhoods
has important implications for the likelihood of adoption of new technologies, the coexis-
tence of dierent practices as well as the temporal and spatial patterns of diusion in a
society. Our conclusions raise an important question: what types of information structures
are likely to occur/emerge in societies?
Appendix A
We begin with a formal construction of the probability space, (
;F ;P

). Fix  2 .
For each i 2 N , x 2 X and t = 1; 2; : : : let Y
x
i;t
 Y . For each t = 1; 2; : : : let


t
=
Q
i2N
Q
x2X
Y
x
i;t
be the space of the t
th
outcomes across all agents and all actions.


t
is endowed with the product topology. Let H
t
 

t
be of the form
H
t
=
Y
i2N
Y
x2X
H
x
i;t
(A:1)
where H
x
i;t
is a Borel subset of Y
x
i;t
for each i 2 N and x 2 X. (If the number of agents n
is countably innite, H
x
i;t
 Y
x
i;t
for all but a nite set of i's). Dene the probability P

t
of
the set H
t
as :
P

t
(H
t
) =
Y
i2N
Y
x2X
Z
H
x
i;t
(y; x; )d,(y): (A:2)
P

t
extends uniquely to the -eld on 

t
generated by sets of the formH
t
. Let 
 =
Q
1
t=1


t
.
For cylinder sets H  
 of the form
H =
T
Y
t=1
H
t

1
Y
t=T+1


t
: (A:3)
let P

(H) be dened as P

(H) =
Q
T
t=1
P

t
(H
t
). Let F be the -eld on 
 generated by
sets of the type given by (A.3). P

extends uniquely to the sets in F . This completes the
construction of the probability space (
;F ;P

).
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Let  be endowed with the discrete topology, and suppose B is the Borel -eld on this
space. For rectangles of the form AH where A   and H is a measurable subset of 
,
let P
i
(AH) be given by
P
i
(AH) =
X
2A

i;1
()P

(H): (A:4)
for each agent i 2 N . Each P
i
extends uniquely to all of B  F . Since every agent's
prior belief lies in the interior of D(), the measures fP
i
g are pairwise mutually absolutely
continuous.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 3.1: For each  2 , the belief 
i;t
() of agent i at the beginning
of time t can be regarded as a version of the conditional expectation E[1
fg

kF
i;t
] where
the expectation is with respect to the measure P
i
. Since this sequence of random variables
is a uniformly bounded martingale (see Easley and Kiefer, 1988) with respect to the in-
creasing sequence of -elds fF
i;t
g the Martingale Convergence Theorem applies, so that

i;t
converges almost surely to the F
i;1
-measurable limit belief 
i;1
. Let Q
i
be the set of
sample paths where agent i's beliefs converge, where P
i
(Q
i
) = 1. Since the measures are
pairwise mutually absolutely continuous and the set of agents N is at most countable, the
set Q = \
i2N
Q
i
also has P
i
measure 1 for each i. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Let x 2 X. Since x
0
2 X
i
(!) there exists a subsequence ft
k
g such
that u(x
0
; 
i;t
k
(!))  u(x; 
i;t
k
(!)). Taking limits and using the continuity of u on the set
D(), we get u(x
0
; 
i;1
(!))  u(x; 
i;1
(!)). Since x is arbitrary, this proves statement (a).
Statement (b) follows from the maximum theorem and part (a). 2
Let supp() to denote the support of a probability distribution . We have:
Lemma 3.2 . Suppose i 2 N(j) and ! 2 Q

1
. If, for some  6= 
1
,  2 supp(
j;1
(!))
then u(x; 

) = u(x; 

1
) for all x 2 X
i
(!) [X
j
(!).
Proof: Suppose the conditions of Lemma 3.2 hold but u(x; 

1
) 6= u(x; 

) for some
x 2 X
i
(!) [X
j
(!). Then, by denition, we have
Z
Y
j(y; x; 
1
)  (y; x; )jd,(y) > 0: (B:1)
Since x is chosen innitely often either by agent i or by j (or both), and agent j observes
agent i, the law of large numbers ensures that 
j;1
()(!) = 0, so that  is not in the
support of 
j;1
(!). This contradiction establishes the result. 2
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Remark B.1: Since i 2 N(i) for every i 2 N , the above lemma implies that for every
x 2 X
i
(!), u(x; ) is constant on the set
f j supp()  supp(
i;1
(!))g:
In particular, U
i;1
(!)  u(x; 
i;1
(!)) = u(x; 

1
) for each x 2 X
i
(!).
Lemma 3.3 . Suppose ! 2 Q

1
. If i 2 N(j), then U
j;1
(!)  U
i;1
(!).
Proof: We shall show that if x
0
2 X
j
(!), then u(x
0
; 

1
)  u(x; 

1
), for all x 2 X
i
(!). This
will suce for the proof since from Lemma 3.2 and Remark B.1 we have
U
j;1
(!)  u(x
0
; 
j;1
(!)) = u(x
0
; 

1
) = u(x
0
; 

) for all  2 supp(
j;1
): (B:2)
and
U
i;1
(!)  u(x; 
i;1
(!)) = u(x; 

1
) = u(x; 

) for all  2 supp(
j;1
): (B:3)
There are two cases: if 
j;1
(!) = 

1
the result follows trivially from Lemma 3.1. In the
second case, suppose that  6= 
1
also lies in the support of 
j;1
(!). We now proceed
by contradiction. Assume that u(x
0
; 

1
) < u(x; 

1
). Since  6= 
1
lies in the support of

j;1
(!), Lemma 3.2 above together with the facts that x
0
2 X
j
(!) and x 2 X
i
(!) implies
that u(x
0
; 
j;1
(!)) < u(x; 
j;1
(!)). However this contradicts Lemma 3.1 above and hence
u(x
0
; 

1
)  u(x; 

1
). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2: If i and j are two agents in N , then either i 2 N(j) or there
exist agents j
1
; : : : ; j
m
such that j
1
2 N(j), j
2
2 N(j
1
) and so on until i 2 N(j
m
). In the
rst case, Lemma 3.3 applies directly to show that U
j;1
(!)  U
i;1
(!) while in the latter
case the same is true by transitivity. The result follows by interchanging the roles of i and
j. 2
Appendix C
Let i 2 N . If agent i were to choose x 2 X between period t and t
0
  1 and observe the
corresponding outcomes fy
x
i;n
g
t
0
 1
n=t
, the product likelihood ratio of state  with respect to

1
at the beginning of time t
0
would be:
r
x;
i
(t; t
0
) =
t
0
 1
Y
n=t
(y
x
i;n
; x; )
(y
x
i;n
; x; 
1
)
: (C:1)
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By convention we assume that r
x;
i
(t; t
0
) = 1 if t = t
0
. Moreover, if t = 1 we write r
x;
i
(1; t
0
)
simply as r
x;
i;t
0
.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (Sketch): Let j 2 N . For  2 (0; 1) and x 2 G(

1
) let B
x;
j;1
be
the set B
x;
whose existence is assumed in condition (UPI). Using arguments analogous to
Lemma 4.1, we can establish that there exists a   1, an  2 (0; 1) such that 
KjXj
< 1
and a set A

j
dened as:
A

j
=
Y
x2G(

1
)
B
x;
j;1
f max
x2G(

1
)
sup
2
r
x;
j
(2; )  gf max
x2XnG(

1
)
sup
t1
r
x;
j;t
 g
1
Y
t=1
Y
j
0
2N(j)
Y
x2X
Y
x
j
0
;t
:
(C:2)
such that P

1
(A

j
) =  > 0 (by using the assumption that x 2 G(

1
) satises the (UPI)
property). Fix i 2
^
N
K;
^
d
. Dene A
i
= \
j2N(i)
A

j
. Clearly P

1
(A
i
)  
K
> 0. Note
that since agent i is assumed to have a belief 
i;1
(
1
) 
^
d, she will choose an action
x 2 G(

1
); by construction of the set A
i
, she will observe an outcome y 2 B
x;
. As
such a y provides suciently strong positive information concerning state 
1
, agent i's
posterior belief will be very close to the truth, as in equation (4.6). The proof for the
case of jRj = 0 now follows along the lines of steps 2 and 3 of Theorem 4.1, and is omit-
ted.
The case jRj > 0: Let
^
Q = f[
i2N
X
i
(!) 6 G(

1
)g. We shall assume P

1
(
^
Q) > 0 initially.
Clearly, there exists   1 (without loss of generality having the same value as above) such
that P

1
(
^
Q \ A

R
) > 0, where A

R
is the set
A

R
=
\
j2R
f max
2n
1
max
x2X
sup
t1
r
x;
j;t
 g 
1
Y
t=1
Y
j2NnR
Y
x2X
Y
x
j;t
: (C:3)
For i 2
^
N
K;
^
d
consider the set A
i
constructed as above, but excluding all j 2 N(i) who are
members of R. The probability of A
i
conditional on A

R
satises
P

1
(A
i
j A

R
) =
Q
j2N(i)nR
P

1
(A

j
) P

1
(A

R
)
P

1
(A

R
)
 
K
> 0: (C:4)
Using (C.4) we can establish the analog of Step 2 in Theorem 4.1 above, i.e., P

1
(\
i2
^
N
K;
^
d
A
c
i
j
A

R
)  lim
j
^
N
K;
^
d
j!1
(1   
K
)
j
^
N
K;
^
d
j
= 0. Note that for ! 2 A
i
\ A

R
, as 
i;1

^
d, our
construction ensures that G(
i;t
)  G(

1
) for all t  1. Thus on the set A
i
\ A

R
,
agent i will always choose an action in G(

1
), so that we can employ the arguments
in Step 3 in Theorem 4.1 above to ensure that X
j
(!)  G(

1
) for all agents j 2 N on
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the set A

R
. It follows that P

1
([
i2N
fX
i
(!) 6 G(

1
)g j A

R
) = 0. However, this im-
plies P

1
(
^
Q\A

R
) = P([
i2N
fX
i
(!) 6 G(

1
)g \A

R
) = 0, which contradicts our earlier
statement that P

1
(
^
Q \ A

R
) > 0. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2: We suppose for simplicity that G(

1
) is a singleton. The ar-
guments presented below extend easily to cover the case where there are multiple optimal
actions. We rst establish the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2 . Suppose (Ia)-(Ic) hold. Let  2 D() satisfy (
k(x
1
)
(x
1
))  . (a) If
action x
1
is chosen t times, and outcomes y
1
2 B
x
1
,: : :,y
t
2 B
x
1
are observed, then the pos-
terior belief ((x
1
)
+
)
0
 . (b) The conclusion in (a) is unaected if an action x 2 Xnx
1
has also been chosen and y 2 Y is observed.
The proof exploits condition (Ib) and involves some straightforward calculations. We omit
it due to space constraints. Lemma 4.2 is useful since if  2 D() satises ((x
1
)
+
)  
then u(x
1
; )  u
min
.
Proof (Theorem 4.2) Let j 2 N . Arguments analogous to those used in Lemma 4.1
establish that there exists a real number   1 such that
P

1
(sup
t
0
>t
max
2(x
1
)
 
r
x
1
;
j
(t; t
0
)  ) =  > 0: (C:5)
Choose T to satisfy 
T

K
< 1, where  2 (0; 1) is the number assumed in condition (Ic).
Let A

j
be dened as:
A

j
=
T
Y
t=1
B
x
1
j;t
fsup
t
0
>T
max
2(x
1
)
 
r
x
1
;
j
(T+1; t
0
)  g
Y
x2Xnx
1
1
Y
t=1
Y
x
j;t

Y
j
0
2Nnj
Y
x2X
1
Y
t=1
Y
x
j
0
;t
: (C:6)
where we have written B
x
1
as B
x
1
j;t
to avoid confusion. Fix i 2 N
K;
. Let A
i
= \
j2N(i)
A

j
.
By construction P

1
(A
i
) = 
jN(i)j
 
K
=  > 0.
We claim that if ! 2 A
i
then agent i will choose the optimal action x
1
, for all time
periods after some nite point. The rst step is to show that agent i will observe at
least T trials of action x
1
. We begin by showing it is tried at least once by some agent
j 2 N(i). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose not. This implies, in particular, agent
i observes innitely many trials of some action x 2 Xnx
1
. Since x is suboptimal, the
strong law of large numbers will ensure that lim
t!1

i;t
() = 0 for all states  where
u(x; 

) > u(x; 

1
). Choose  > 0 such that u
min
   > max
x2Xnx
1
u(x; 

1
). The above
argument implies that at a nite time t
0
, agent i's expected utility u(x; 
i;t
0
)  u
min
  .
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Since x
1
has not been chosen and the choice of other actions does not aect i's beliefs con-
cerning 
k(x
1
)
(x
1
), we have 
i;t
0
(
k(x
1
)
(x
1
))  . By the observation following Lemma 4.2
this implies u(x
1
; 
i;t
0
)  u
min
, which implies that x
1
would be preferable to x at the time
of the next choice of x by agent i. Thus action x
1
must be tried by agent i at some time
^
t, and this contradicts our original supposition.
We now make the following observation. Suppose that at time t each agent j 2 N(i)
has chosen action x
1
for 0  t
j
 T periods. Hence upto time t, for each j 2 N(i)
agent i observes the outcomes y
x
1
j;1
2 B
x
1
j;1
, : : :,y
x
1
j;t
j
2 B
x
1
j;t
j
. It follows from Lemma 4.2
that agent i's posterior belief 
i;t
((x
1
)
+
)  . Note by Lemma 4.2(b) that the pos-
sibility that agents j 2 N(i) may have also chosen actions in Xnx
1
does not alter the
conclusion. The same argument used above can be repeated in conjunction with this ob-
servation to show that agent i must observe at least T choices of action x
1
by agents
j 2 N(i).
Let t(T ) be the time when agent i has observed a trial of x
1
for the T
th
time. Let
^
i;t
0
2 D() be agent i's belief after incorporating all information about actions x 2 Xnx
1
upto time t
0
 t(T ). We get

i;t
0
((x
1
)
 
) =
P
2(x
1
)
 
^
i;t
0
()
Q
j2N(i)
r
x
1
;
j
(1; t
j
)
^
i;t
0
(
k(x
1
)
(x
1
)) +
P
2(x
1
)
++
^
i;t
0
()
Q
j2N(i)
r
x
1
;
j
(1; t
j
) +
P
2(x
1
)
 
^
i;t
0
()
Q
j2N(i)
r
x
1
;
j
(1; t
j
)
(C.7)
Since ! 2 A
i
by assumption we have
Q
j2N(i)
r
x
1
;
j
(1; t
j
)  
T

K
< 1 for all  2 (x
1
)
 
.
This is because, by construction of the set A
i
, for the rst T observation of x
1
by agent
i, the product likelihood ratio r
x
1
;
for any  2 (x
1
)
 
is at most 
T
, and in all subse-
quent trials for each agent j 2 N(i) the product likelihood ratio is at most . However,
by (Ia) we have ^
i;t
0
(
k(x
1
)
(x
1
)) = 
i;1
(
k(x
1
)
(x
1
))   and ^
i;t
0
((x
1
)
 
)  1   . Thus
P
2(x
1
)
 

i;t
0
()  
T

K
(1   ) < (1   ). It follows from (C.7) that 
i;t
0
((x
1
)
 
) <
(1  )=( + (1   )) = 1   . Thus 
i;t
0
((x
1
)
+
)   and hence u(x
1
; 
i;t
0
)  u
min
. As t
0
is arbitrary, this means that agent i's belief on ! will henceforth never fall below u
min
. As
all suboptimal actions will fall below u
min
   in nite time, agent i must choose action x
1
from some nite time onwards. The rest of the proof now proceeds as in steps 2 and 3 of
Theorem 4.1. 2
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Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Let N
0
1
= fj 2 N
1
jN(i) = N
1
g denote the set of agents who
are linked only to members of their own sub-group, and let N
00
1
= fi 2 N
1
jN(i) \N
2
6= g
denote the set of agents who are also linked to members of the other sub-group. Simi-
larly dene N
0
2
= fi 2 N
2
jN(i) = N
2
g and N
00
2
= fi 2 N
2
jN(i) \ N
1
6= g. Note that
jN
00
1
j = jN
00
2
j = ; also note that 
1
= (H;H).
For any agent i 2 N , let S
i
n
(R
i
m
) denote the number of successes when agent i chooses
action x
1
(x
2
) for n (m) time periods. Note that since 
1
> 
1
, every i 2 N
1
chooses x
1
in t = 1. Assume that every agent j 2 N
00
1
chooses x
1
in each of the periods t = 1; : : : ; n,
where n is some positive integer. A sucient condition for i 2 N
0
1
, to continue to choose
only x
1
in every period t = 1; : : : ; n then follows from (5.2):
p
2(
P
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
P
j2N
0
1
S
j
t
) (k+1)t
<

1
(1  
1
)

1
(1  
1
)
: (D:1)
for every t = 1; : : : ; n. Note that 
1
> 
1
implies that the right hand side of (D.1) is strictly
greater than one, and that 0 < p < 1. Thus a simpler and stronger sucient condition
than (D.1) is that for every t = 1; : : : ; n
p
2(
P
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
P
j2N
0
1
S
j
t
) (k+1)t
< 1)
X
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
X
j2N
0
1
S
j
t

(k + 1)t
2
: (D:2)
assuming as before that agent every j 2 N
00
1
chooses x
1
in each time period up to n. Since
(H,H) is the true state, for each agent i and time t the random variable 2S
i
t
  t is the
sum of independent and identically distributed random variables of the form 2Z  1 where
Z has a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1=2 <  < 1. Since E[Z] = 2   1 > 0,
it follows from the standard theory of random walks that P

1
(f2S
i
t
  t  0 for all t =
0; 1; : : :g) > 0: Fix  > 0 and for t  3 dene  (; t) = (1 + )
q
2t(1  ) log log t.
For t  3, let E
i
t
be the event E
i
t
= fS
i
n
2 [n    (; n); n +  (; n)] for all n 
tg:
Note that the sets E
i
t
are increasing in t. The law of the iterated logarithm (see Billings-
ley 1986) implies that P

1
(
S
1
t=3
E
i
t
) = 1:. It follows from the previous equations that
there is some T such that P

1
(f2S
i
t
  t  0 for all t = 0; 1; : : :g \ E
i
T
) > 0: Let E
i
denote
the above event, i.e. E
i
= f2S
i
t
  t  0 for all t = 0; 1; : : :g \ E
i
T
. The set E
i
is such
that agent i's observations will satisfy S
i
t
 t=2 for every t and also from T onwards,
S
i
t
will be within the bounds prescribed by the law of the iterated logarithm. Note that
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given that the previous equation holds for T it also holds from T
0
> T since the sets fE
i
t
g
are increasing. Thus we shall assume, without loss of generality, that T also satises the
condition
T  inf
n
t j ((k    + 1)(2   1)  )
t
2
  (k    + 1) (; t) > 0
o
: (D:3)
Since k    + 1 > =(2   1) by assumption, the term (k    + 1)(2   1)    is posi-
tive. As the term (k    + 1) (; t) in (D.3) is of the order of t
1=2
log log t it is eventually
dominated by ((k    + 1)(2   1)  )t=2. Hence, T in (D.3) will be nite. In addition,
for all t  T the expression ((k    + 1)(2   1)   )t=2   (k    + 1) (; t) > 0 as
well.
We now consider the situation of agent i 2 N
00
1
given that the rest of N
1
choose only x
1
up
to time n. We shall assume that agent j 2 N
00
2
choose only x
2
in each of the n periods, and
later isolate a set of sample paths where this will in fact be true. Recall that R
j
t
denotes
the number of successes that agent  obtains in t trials from using x
2
. Using (5.2) and
the arguments underlying (D.1) and (D.2) again, a sucient condition for agent i 2 N
00
1
to
choose x
1
for each t = 1; : : : ; n is
X
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
X
j2N
0
1
S
j
t

X
j2N
00
2
R
j
t
+
(k    + 1)t
2
: (D:4)
We now choose the set of sample paths for agent j 2 N
00
1
which satisfy the following
requirements:

E
j
= fS
j
T
= T; S
j
t
 T + (t  T )=2; for all t > Tg: (D:5)
Thus, for sample paths in

E
j
, agent j 2 N
00
1
gets T successes in the rst T trials with
x
1
and subsequently gets a success rate of at least 50 percent in the remaining periods.
Clearly P

1
(

E
j
) > 0.
Next, we consider an agent j 2 N
2
. By denition of the set N
2
, it follows that all j 2 N
2
choose action x
2
in t = 1. Assuming that j 2 N
00
2
chooses x
2
in all periods up to n, using
arguments as above, it follows that a sucient condition for each agent i 2 N
0
2
to choose
x
2
for each t = 1; : : : ; n is :
X
j2N
00
2
R
j
t
+
X
j2N
0
2
R
j
t

(k + 1)t
2
: (D:6)
For agents i 2 N
0
2
consider the sample paths fF
i
n
g dened as F
i
t
= fR
i
n
2 [n  
 (; n); n +  (; n)] for all n  tg. By symmetry with the situation of N
1
, it follows
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that the event F
i
dened as F
i
= f2R
j
t
  t  0 for all t  0g \ F
i
T
, has strictly positive
probability. Lastly, we dene the set

F
j
corresponding to

E
j
where (D.5) will be true
for j 2 N
00
2
in place of j 2 N
00
1
and x
2
instead of x
1
. We now consider the set of sample
paths
Y
j2N
0
1
E
j

Y
j2N
00
1

E
j

Y
j2N
00
2

F
j

Y
j2N
0
2
F
j
: (D:7)
By construction, the above event has strictly positive probability. We claim that on
this set of sample paths every i 2 N
1
chooses x
1
and every j 2 N
2
chooses x
2
for-
ever. We rst consider the situation for t = 1; : : : ; T . For any i 2 N
0
1
, condition (D.2)
is clearly satised, since on our choice of sample paths,
P
j2N
0
1
S
j
t
 (k    + 1)t=2
and
P
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
= t  t=2 so that their sum is at least (k + 1)t=2. Next consider
an agent i 2 N
00
1
. Since
P
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
P
j2N
0
1
S
j
t
 t + (k    + 1)t=2 and the right
hand side of (D.4) equals this value (recall that R
j
T
= T for j 2 N
00
2
on this set of
sample paths) equation (D.4) also holds, ensuring that j 2 N
00
1
will choose x
1
upto
time T . By symmetry, we can show that any agent j 2 N
2
chooses x
2
upto time
T .
We now consider the position after time T . In this case, for each i 2 N
0
1
, we have S
i
t
in the
interval t   (; t). Furthermore, for j 2 N
00
1
, S
j
t
is at least equal to T + (t  T )=2 while
R
j
t
is at most equal to t. From (D.4) we have therefore
X
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
X
j2N
0
1
S
j
t
 
n
X
j2N
00
2
R
j
t
+
(k    + 1)t
2
o

 
n
T +
(t  T )
2
o
+ (k    + 1)
n
t    (; t)
o
 
n
t+
(k    + 1)t
2
o
=
T
2
+
n
(k    + 1)(2   1)  
o
t
2
  (k    + 1) (; t): (D.8)
By our choice of T in (D.3) the last expression above is always non-negative. It follows
that provided that every i 2 N
0
1
chooses x
1
, and j 2 N
00
2
always chooses x
2
, any agent
j 2 N
00
1
will always choose x
1
. We next show agents in N
0
1
will continue to choose x
1
after
time T given that an agent j 2 N
00
1
chooses x
1
forever. This requires condition (D.2) to
hold. However,
X
j2N
00
1
S
j
t
+
X
j2N
0
1
S
j
t
 
n
T +
t  T
2
o
+
(k    + 1)t
2

(k + 1)t
2
: (D:9)
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so (D.2) continues to be satised. By symmetry of the agents N
2
to the agents N
1
, anal-
ogous arguments establish that every agent in N
2
will always choose x
2
.
2
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